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Abstract 
Historical studies, especially the political economic phenomenon in Indonesian, has never been done in the perspective of 
Levi Strauss’s structuralism. The purpose of this research is to reveal the  structural transformation  of foreign interest 
cooptation in Indonesia’s economy during the VOC and New Order Eras through Levi-Strauss’s perspective of 
structuralism. The structural method of this research used archival documentation, historical documents and literature 
study. The results showed that there has been a structural transformation   on the surface structure of foreign interest 
cooptation in Indonesia's economy for the past two periods. The deep structure of foreign interest cooptation in Indonesia’s 
economy occurred on four themes namely perpetrator/actor, areas of life in economic sector, cooptation mechanisms and 
implications. 
Keywords: Transformation, surface structure, deep structure,  foreign cooptation, Indonesia’s economy 
 
1. Introduction 
There are still some doubts among the societies in Indonesia about the nation sovereignty after the proclamation of 
independence in 1945. The doubt is not without evidence and empirical grounds. In the colonial period, the controlled 
economic sector was limited to farms and plantations. During the Old Order, New Order and the Reformation era, various 
strategic sectors such as infrastructure, finance and banking, oil and gas, agriculture and food were increasingly dominated by 
foreigners (Note 2). The economic sectors were even extended to healthcare, education, retail, telecommunication, tourism 
and various consulting services. These evidences confirm the view expressed by experts that Indonesia's dependence on 
outside parties was preserved by foreign nations in this era of globalization, much as it did in the colonial period centuries 
ago (Note 3). 
 It is not an exaggeration to say that Indonesia's economic history is repeating itself, colonialism which occurred in 
the colonial period is now happening again in post-independence era. Based on this historical reality, the study aims to 
explore foreign interests cooptation of Indonesia’s economy which occurred in both periods. Through empirical facts 
analyzed by Levi-Strauss's structuralism perspective, this study provides a scientific contribution of structural transformation 
of foreign interests cooptation of Indonesia’s economy. 
Most of studies about foreign interests cooptation of Indonesia’s economy during colonial until post independence 
eras used historical  perspective (Breeman, 1986; Onghokam, 1983, Kemasang, 1985;  Andaya, 1989;  Knaap, 1999, 2006; 
Sutherland,2000; Souza, 2009), historical politics (Adams, 1996),  political economy  (Boomgaard, 1992, Robertson-Snape,  
1999; Lee, 1997), Posmodernism (Henley, 2004),  ecology (Maimunah, 2012). None of previous studies use  structuralism of 
Levi-Strauss perspective. In the other hand,  the structuralism of Levi-Strauss perspective is not applicated on foreign 
interests cooptation of  economy phenomenon yet. Most of researchers  used this  structuralism of Levi-Strauss perspective  
to study myth, khinsip, art, totem, food, novel, songs lyrics, religion (Levi-Strauss, 1963, 1969, 1978; Ahimsa-Putra, 2001;  
Bernstein, 1979; Strenski. 1980).  
Levi-Strauss's structuralism is a theoretical perspective in human sciences developed by anthropologist Claude 
Levi-Strauss. According to structuralisme of Levi-Strauss, cultural phenomenon basically comes from structure of human 
mind (Levi-Strauss, 1963, Goddard, 1964, Maybury-Lewis, 1976; Lane, 1973). The existence of structure  is unconscious by 
humans (Rossi, 1974). Structure meant by Levi-Strauss (1963: 279-280) is a model that meets several requirements, namely: 
”First, the structure exhibits the characteristics of a system. It is made up of several elements, 
none of which can undergo a change without affecting changes in all the other elements. Second, for any 
given model there should be a possibility of ordering a series a transformations resulting in a group of 
models of the same type. Third, the above properties make it possible to predict how the model will react 
if one or more of its elements are submitted to certain modifications. Finally, the model should be 
constuted so as to make immediately intelligible all the observed facts.” 
Through a variety of his work, Levi-Strauss (1963, 1969, 1978), conduct a structural analysis from various cultural 
phenomena such as kinship, myths, masks, and foods. These phenomenons can be regarded as languages, or more accurately 
expressed as a set of signs and symbols that convey specific messages (Lane, 1970, Lane, in Ahimsa Putra, 2001: 67). 
Therefore, there are orders and regularities in these phenomenons. The phenomenon of foreign interests cooptation of 
Indonesia’s economy during colonial and post-independence, in the context of this theoretical perspective, is assumed to have 
orders and regularities. According to Ahimsa Putra (2001) cultural phenomenon that appears to be diverse on the surface in 
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Levi-Strauss’s structuralism perspective is referred to as surface structure while the same nature that gives rise to a variety of 
surface structure is referred as deep structure. 
2. Methodology 
The object of this research is the political economic phenomenon of foreign interests cooptation of Indonesia’s 
economy which occurred in two different temporal periods, the VOC period and the New Order Era. This study was 
conducted at two locations, namely Malang and Yogyakarta. More specifically the location of this research is in the Regional 
Archive Agency of Yogyakarta and Gadjah Mada University Library in Yogyakarta as well as the Laboratory of History in 
FIS UM, Malang. The reason for selecting these three study sites are the consideration of adequacy and availability of 
documents and references. 
The data collection technique in this study is documentation. Documentation method is used to track various 
documents and references related to the phenomenon under study at Regional Archives of Yogyakarta and University of 
Gadjah Mada FIB Library. Various documents that were used as the data source in this study includes various agreements 
and rules/regulations, legislation deregulation package eg. Basic Agrarian Law, Land Acquisition Act, Presidential Decree 
(Keppres), Letter of Intent (LoI) that were made in the colonial period and theNew Order Era. 
Data analysis in the Levi-Strauss’s method of structuralism interpret object of study as a linguistic phenomenon in 
the sense as a series of symbols or text that convey certain meanings. Themes that have been explored are then analyzed 
syntagmatically and paradigmatically. Syntagmatic is a horizontal structural relationship, while paradigmatic is a vertical 
structural relationships that arise from the association of a particular context. Syntagmatic and paradigmatic analysis will 
produce a series of relations or relations of relations which then describe the overall surface structures that are being 
explored. 
 
3. Result and Discussion 
Results obtained through structural analysis is basically a simultaneous reading of both horizontal (syntagmatic) 
and vertical (paradigmatic) of foreign interests cooptation phenomenon of Indonesia’s economy in both 
periods. Syntagmaticly, the results of structural analysis focuses on the themes of cooptation, which are perpetrator/actor, 
area of life in the economic sector, and cooptation implications and mechanism theme. While the paradigmatic results are 
based on the appropriate context from both periods, namely during the VOC and the New Order Era. 
 
3.1. Foreign Interests cooptation of Indonesia’s economy in VOC Period 
Foreign interest cooptation of Indonesia’s economy in colonial era takes place during the VOC (the Verenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie, Dutch East India Company)  era. The main cooptation actor during VOC era were the masters in 
Netherlands, the bourgeoisie/businessman corporate owners. VOC was established in March 1602, with the approval of 
Prince Maurits representing the government and ratified by the States General of Netherlands. The approval was granted, on 
one hand was to protect and strengthen the long-distance business/bourgeoisie shareholders on the corporate private trading 
in the Netherlands, and on the other hand was to give multiplied benefits to the ruler, power and prosperity of the country. In 
the formation plaque which is valid for 20 years (extendable), the Dutch authorities confirmed VOC through the provision of 
political and economic power in its spheres of influence or power. VOC has the sovereign right as a nation which has the 
power as a legitimate government to make and force regulations, as well as having a monopoly right to dominate the 
economic and social resources from Tanjung Harapan to 100 miles East of the Solomon Islands to the Bering Strait. VOC 
obligation is to fill state coffers. VOC initial operation was supported by capital strength that comes from corporations and 
the country. This implies collusion of the state and corporate interests through trade union.VOC was an extension of the 
government powers to co-opt other nations to achieve economic surplus. 
Cooptation perpetrators also come from the ranks of VOC organization’s driving actors that exploits and leeches, 
namely VOC personnel or management in Netherlands and in Indonesia. VOC parent organization in Netherlands was led by 
a panel that is called De Hereen Zeventien (Gentlemen XVII), chosen from allied trading corporations. The authority of the 
leadership council is to set regulatory policies such as investments, shipping and distribution. Since 1650 the assembly is 
assisted by a permanent commission called Haagsche Besoignes, in charge of improving relationships and communications 
between the leading council in Netherlands with VOC in Asia. This facilitates the cooptation actors in Netherlands to 
exercises control over the cooptation perpetrators in Indonesia. Due to the expansion of VOC in the Indonesia territory, since 
1609 General Governor was elected as the supreme leader of VOC. 
The sovereign right that countries gave to VOC as noted above, became the foundation used by VOC officials to 
construct various practical-operational regulation containing the cooptation mechanisms in conquered lands. Everything is 
geared to realize the achievement of its monopoly rights. Cooptation mechanisms in Indonesia are constructed and 
implemented gradually in accordance with the development of political and economic conditions. 
VOC faces the economic trade power of native rulers and merchants which traditionally holds a monopoly in the 
trade of commodities, as well as the Portuguese, Spanish and England who also compete for monopoly. Generally VOC 
launched a trade control operation by co-opting native traders to eliminate competitors from Europe (Portugal, Spain, UK), 
and in doing so also took over and ended the native merchants monopoly. 
VOC cooptation mechanism outside Java was done through alliances, wars, and negotiations (Ismain, 1999 b). In 
Maluku, VOC established alliances with Islamic traditional ruler (sultan) and use them as allies to expel the Portuguese in 
1605 and Spain in 1663, so they could control the spice trade. Military strength were deployed to control Makassar as a 
trading path for spice, and VOC gain political-economic concessions through Bongaya agreements imposed in 1669. Efforts 
to takeover pepper trade monopoly in Aceh was made through deception by approaching local authorities subordinate of 
Aceh in West Sumatra, which then offered VOC the right to purchase pepper under Painan agreement. 
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VOC cooptation mechanism in Java utilizes traditional power of the rulers to get the economic surplus (Ismain, 
1999 a). After successfully conquering the native traders, VOC establish good relations with kings and regents to obtain a 
quota of mandatory submission form (contingenten and verplichte leverantion). It was as a reward for VOC being their 
protector and guarantor of the existence of current traditional ruler, which gradually turns into a traditional state regulator, 
until finally recognized as traditional rulers and subject to the VOC. Furthermore, native traders trading activity were 
restricted or even eliminated. VOC prefer Chinese traders as middlemen. 
VOC is an organization formed for the sake of long-distance trade. All rights given by the state is intended to 
achieve a trade surplus that contributes to the wealth of the home country. Therefore, the main focus and the most important 
co-opted sector was trading. This field has been growing rapidly long before the presence of VOCs in the locale. Native 
traders were major spice trade monopolists, who traded up to Europe, but was later taken over by the VOC through a variety 
of mechanisms of cooptation. Trade done by VOC are armed and monopoly trade, in order to control trade ports that lie in 
the trading path of Moluccas to Malacca. At every port they controlled, they established factorij (trade offices, castles, 
forts). Since 1619 JP Coen controls and build Batavia as VOC center of power in Indonesia, and serves as the main meeting 
place of various factorij trading network controlled. From this place, activity and trading volume is recorded and distributed 
to the Netherlands to supply actual market needs in Europe. 
Trading control process done by VOC has gotten some resistance from native traders. As noted, the main 
monopolists of trading before the VOC were kings, dukes who have perivelages rights in trade. This encourages VOC to 
coopt the political field to dominate the trade field. Around Indonesia, VOC did a political interference in Maluku (Ternate, 
Tidore), Makasar (Goa-Tallo) Sumatra (Aceh), Java (Banten, Java regent North Shore, Mataram), and others (Ismain, 
1998). Generally VOC intervene traditional political power by using divide et impera (pitting) politics to create (enhance) the 
development of intrigue, conflict and succession. Furthermore VOC sides (alliance) on certain factions by force or request for 
help against other factions, in order to gain economic concessions by negotiation or agreement, in return of accompliance. On 
one hand, traditional rulers was co-opted by confirming its traditional position, on the other hand their political and economic 
power were reduced, restricted, and even subjected to VOC regulation. 
Cooptation model in this political field led to political disintegration (Ternate-Tidore, Banten, Mataram), 
productive economic area shrinkage. Large political entity such as the Mataram kingdom was split into four political 
powers. Cooptation mechanisms that cooptation actors did during the VOC era have paradox implications. VOC supremacy 
was increasingly dominant, while the native rulers (traders) were fading in world-trade economy. Maritime traditions and 
shipping and trade technology collapse, since it was isolated and replaced by VOC. The main role as a trading monopolist 
disappeared and shifted into pirates. Local excellence as an exporter of commodities for the world market also disappeared, 
shifting into a consumer and importer nation. On the other hand, traditional rulers, especially in Java, only play a role in 
agriculture sector and were stuck in feudal mentality (Onghokham. 1983). 
 
 
3.2. Foreign Interests cooptation against Indonesia’s economy in New Order Era 
Foreign interests cooptation of Indonesia’s economy during the New Order Era, reviewed from Levi-Strauss’s 
structuralism analysis, shows the transformation of surface structure based on on deep structure of  four themes which are 
actors, mechanisms, areas of life, and implications of cooptation. The actors in foreign interest cooptation of Indonesia’s 
economy are composed of foreign and national/local actors. International actors are broadly divided into several groups, 
namely international agencies, foreign companies and foreign countries. International agencies, among others were the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). WTO had been making the rules in Indonesia since 1994 at a domestic level to reduce import tariffs. While the IMF 
and the World Bank provide loans to countries in the world by requiring them to follow regulatory requirements set by 
them. Prasentiatono (2003: 118-119) states: 
IMF senantiasa beranggapan bahwa untuk semua negara hanya ada satu obat, yaitu yang 
terkenal dengan sebutan “structural adjustment programs” (SAP). Di seluruh dunia dimanapun IMF 
senantiasa menerapkan kebijaksanaan SAP ini terhadap negara-negara yang mengalami masalah 
keuangan. Negara-negara harus  melakukan tiga hal: liberalisasi, deregulasi dan privatisasi. Ketiganya 
merupakan pilar utama dari konsep pemulihan ekonomi bagi negara-negara berkembang, yang 
kemudian disebut sebagai “Washington Consensus”(Note 4). 
IMF always assume that for all countries there is only one cure, which is known as "structural 
adjustment programs" (SAP). In the whole world everywhere, IMF constantly implement SAP's policy 
toward countries experiencing financial problems. Countries must do three things: liberalization, 
deregulation and privatization. All three are the main pillars of economic recovery concept for 
developing countries, which are then referred to as the "Washington Consensus" 
Three major international institutions namely IMF, World Bank and WTO are international actors whom are 
referred by Peet (2003) as the Unholly Trinity because of their political economic intervention that are not in the interests of 
the countries assisted. Even Cavanagh in his commentary on the book by Peet firmly stated that the existence of the three 
international institutions have already deviated from its original mission and instead they merely serve the interests of global 
corporations. Cavanagh statement has a very clear relevance to the Indonesia context, as already mentioned at the beginning 
of this article where 85% of Indonesian oil and gas sector is controlled by foreign corporations. 
During the New Order government, there was an elite group of local conglomerate that became actors in the 
dynamics of Indonesian economy at that time. These conglomerates enjoyed the rapid growth because of their special 
treatment from the government in power, especially in the provision of credit subsidies thanks to personal and business 
relations with the authorities at the time of President Soeharto in particular: 
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Many of these conglomerates had grown rapidly during the Soeharto era because of the 
preferential treatment they had received from the government, notably in the allocation of large sums of 
subsidised credit, thanks to the personal and business relationships they had established with the 
indigenous power holders, particularly President Soeharto. The size of these conglomerates only became 
evident when they or their subsidiaries had gone public after the stock exchange boom in 1989 (Wie, 
2006). 
 
The role of actors from conglomerates were mainly from Chinese ethnic in the New Order. In fact, according to 
economic historian Thee Kian Wee, Tinghoa entrepreneurs have a much greater role and reach a wider economic life 
compared to previous periods: 
 
The Chinese were able to move into a wide range of economic activities, including large-estate 
agriculture, manufacturing, real estate and banking, and thus prosper to a much greater degree than 
during the Dutch colonial period and during the Soekarno era (Wie, 2006). 
 
Foreign interests cooptation mechanism of Indonesian economy during the New Order were through formal 
regulations (rule of law). Regulation becomes the legality of the existence and development of foreign domination in 
Indonesia. Why formal institutions such as the law are so important to be influenced? 
 
Jawaban sederhananya adalah karena institusi formal ini menyediakan struktur bagi pola 
relasi sosial. Apapun aktivitas yang dilakukan, baik individual maupun  sosial, sangat dipengaruhi oleh 
institusi sosial yang dalam hal ini adalah aturan hukum. Dengan kata lain, hukum mendeterminasi 
semua interaksi sosial dan politik dalam suatu masyarakat. Namun, di sisi lain, institusi sosial, termasuk 
aturan hukum, juga merupakan produk politik di mana isi setiap produk hukum dan semua elemen 
institusi sosial tersebut akan sangat ditentukan oleh kepentingan politik yang melingkupi kemunculannya, 
Dengan demikian seperti dikatakan oleh para teorisi public choice, proses pembentukan institusi (proses 
pembuatan aturan hukum atau legislasi) akan selalu melibatkan proses transaksi politik. Dan proses 
transaksi politik ini sangat dimungkinkan oleh struktur institusional yang lebih besar, yakni sistem politik 
yang dianut sebuah negara, baik sistem demokratis mapun sistem ototriter.  (Hadi, 2010: 8-9) 
The simple answer is because it provides a formal institutional structure for the pattern of social relations. 
Whatever the undertaken activities is, both individual and social, are strongly influenced by social 
institutions which in this case is the rule of law. In other words, the law determine all social and political 
interaction in a community. However, on the other hand, social institutions, including the rule of law, is 
also a political product in which the contents of any legal product and all elements of social institutions 
will be very much determined by political interests surrounding its emergence, thus as said by the public 
choice theorists, the establishment process of an institution (the process of making laws or legislation) 
will always involve a process of political transactions. And this political transaction processes are made 
possible by the larger institutional structures, namely the political system adopted by a country, either a 
democratic system or an authoritarian system (Hadi, 2010: 8-9).  
This regulatory mechanism is what generates a lot of formal legal rules in various forms in the New Order Era. At 
the beginning of the New Order government, UU No. 1.Tahun 1967 about Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was introduced 
which includes the provisions that foreign party may only own shares up to 5% on a wide range of strategic sectors. While at 
1967 foreign party may only have a maximum stake of 5%, a year later the regulation undergo significant 
change. Government, through Law No. 6 In 1968 clearly affirms that the foreign party may own shares up to almost 
50%. This can be seen in Article 3 Paragraph (1) which states that national company is a company that is owned at least 51% 
through domestic capital investement by the state and/or national private. --- A change that foreigner may own 49%. 
In 1985 BKPM as the body that regulates the flow of FDI made a policy: the period of investment approval by 
BKPM changed from 12 weeks to 6 weeks. In 1986 the government made a fundamental change in the UU 1967 about FDI, 
which concerns the extension of foreign companies permits for 30 years and the elimination of an investment requirement of 
US $ 1 million in some activities such as consulting and others. At this time the policy was called Paket 6 Mei 1986 with 
some policy points: (1) encourage businesses that at least 85% of its output is exported, (2) provide loans and bank facilities 
when approximately 75% of capital stock (equity) are owned by Indonesian people, when at least 51% of the shares are 
offered in the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX), and if at least 51% of the shares are owned by the Indonesian people and for at 
least 51% of the shares offered, 20% are offered on BEI. To provide legal protection for foreign investors, the government 
agreed on Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA) with 61 countries. 
In May 1990 the New Order government changed the regulation of FDI through government regulation to reduce 
the minimum investment that can be embedded by foreign inverstor in various sectors from US $ 1 million to US $ 250 
thousand. This regulation also provides an opportunity for foreign investors to invest in various sectors previously closed to 
foreigner such as telecommunications, shipping, aviation, railway and mass media (Hadi, 2010: 19). 
On November 2 1994, Indonesia ratified the WTO Establishment Agreement through UU No. 7 Tahun 1994. 
Through this policy, Indonesia not only liberalized its trade system, but also reduced its protection.  
In 1994 the government issued PP No. 20/1994, in article 5, paragraph (1) there is a provision: "Companies which 
are established as referred to in Article 2 paragraph (1) letter (a) can conduct business activities that are categorized as 
important for the country and dominate the life of the people, namely ports, production, transmission and distribution of 
electric power generally, telecommunications, shipping, aviation, water, common rail, atomic power plant and the mass 
media. Article 6, paragraph (1) PP No. 20/1994 contains the following provisions: "Indonesian participant shares as referred 
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to in Article 2 paragraph (1) letter (a) are at least 5% of the total paid up capital of the company at the time of 
establishment. These provisions allowed foreign investors to own shares up to 95% (Hadi, 2010: 19-20). 
Foreign interests cooptation implications on Indonesia’s economy during the New Order Era through a series of 
regulatory mechanisms as stated above eventually led to a debt trap that becomes a vicious circle in the national 
economy . Rachbini (1995: 63) highlights the problems of a country's debt as follows: 
 
Utang luar negeri kemudian harus dipahami sebagai bisnis biasa, yang dilaksanakan oleh 
lembaga-lembaga multilateral dengan resiko banngkrutnya sistem ekonomi suatu negara sebagaimana 
resiko dialami oleh perusahaan-perusahaan bisnis biasa. Pada sisi pandangan seperti ini, kita tidak bisa 
melihat peranan normatif Bank Dunia dan IMF sebagai agen pembangunan yang bisa menyelamatkan 
ekonomi negara-negara miskin. Yang terjadi sebaliknya, transaksi utang luar negeri dilakukan tanpa 
kendali di luar batas kemampuan ekonomi suatu negara sehingga timbul kesulitan dalam 
pengembaliannya 
Kenyataan sebaliknya kita lihat karena dalam kenyataan justru negara-negara yang tidak 
banyak tergantung pada utang luar negeri yang berhasil memacu pembangunannya seperti Taiwan, 
Korea Selatan, Hongkong, dan Singapura. Sebaliknya negara-negara yang tergantung pada utang luar 
negeri justru semakin kritis kondisi ekonomi dan ketergantungannya terhadap utang luar negeri. 
Foreign debt should then be understood as an ordinary business, which is conducted by 
multilateral institutions with the risk of the collapse of the economic system of a country as the risk 
experienced by ordinary business firms. On this side of view, we cannot see the normative role of the 
World Bank and the IMF as an agent of economic development that could save poor countries. The 
opposite happens, the foreign debt transaction are done without control and outside the limits of a 
country's economy causing difficulty in repayment 
The fact is we see the contrary in reality, countries that are not too dependent on foreign debt 
successfully spurred development such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Instead, 
countries that depend on foreign debt their economic conditions and dependence on foreign debt become 
even more critical. 
 
Foreign interests cooptation implications on Indonesia’s economy during the New Order Era were not just limited 
to the economic field, in particular the national debt, but what was also very politically substantial was the issue of 
sovereignty as a nation. Various international agencies which act as donors turned out to have been dictating development 
policies in Indonesia behind their debt provision scenario through various regulatory mechanisms which must be 
implemented by the government. In addition to the issue of sovereignty as a nation, foreign interests cooptation on 
Indonesia’s economy also resulted in human rights violations and Customary Law, that led to social conflict and 
environmental damage (Maimunah, 2012). 
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The research finding as discussed above can be formulated in table 1 below.   
 
 
4. Conclusion 
The application of Levi-Strauss’s theory of structuralism in this study proved to be able to demonstrate 
the structural transformations of surface structures from the historical phenomenon in the form of foreign interest 
cooptation of Indonesia’s economy during the VOC and the New Order Era. The surface structure of the 
historical phenomenon indicates differences but also structural similarities (deep structure) in the theme of the 
actors, the mechanism of cooptation, who co-opted the field of life and the implications of cooptation. At this 
stage it appears that foreign cooptation of Indonesia’s economy, despite happening in two very distant and 
different period of time, has regularity and repeatability, as assumed by Levi-Strauss’s theory of structuralism. 
Table 1.  Structural Transformation of Foreign Interests of Indonesia’s Economy  
at VOC Era and New Order Era 
 
DEEP STRUCTURE 
ACTORS ECONOMICS LIFE MECHANIS
M 
IMPLICATI
ONS 
SURAFCESTRUCTURE   SURAFCE 
STRUCTURE 
SURAFCE  
STRUCTURE 
SURAFCE 
STRUCTURE 
VOC NEW  
ORDER 
VOC NEW 
ORDER 
VOC NEW 
ORDER 
VOC  NEW 
ORDER 
the masters in 
Netherlands 
Tionghoa 
conglomerates 
Plantation 
 
Plantation alliances Corruption 
Collusion 
Nepotism   
Maritime 
traditions 
and 
shipping 
and trade 
technology 
collapse 
Trap Debt  
Nation 
Prince Maurits Indegenous 
conglomerates 
Trade Trade War Giving 
debt 
From 
trader to 
pirate 
human 
rights 
violations 
and 
Customary 
Law,  
the 
bourgeoisie/businessman 
corporate owners 
MNC  Mining negotiation Regulation Split of 
kingdom  
social 
conflict  
De Hereen Zeventien  
(Gentlemen XVII) 
 
ADB  Banking 
and 
finance 
Regulation  Kingdom 
sovereignty 
Environ-
mental 
damage 
Chinesse traders IMF  Real 
estate 
utilizes 
traditional 
power of 
the rulers 
to get the 
economic 
surplus 
  Nation 
soverignty 
 
WORLD 
BANK  
 Auto-
motive 
    
 WTO       
 
MNC       
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These results indicate that we have not yet achieved true freedom as long as the sovereignty of the 
nation is still not in the hand of the motherland. This reality should be a matter of national reflection so that the 
future of this nation's sovereignty would no longer be a hostage to foreign interest cooptation. The new 
government of Indonesia with the "Work Cabinet" should concretely started realizing Bung Karno’s idea so that 
foreign interests do not dominate the country more freely as had happened since the days of VOC. 
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Notes 
Note 1.. This article is largely based on a paper, Transformasi  dalam Struktur Luar Kooptasi 
Kepentingan Asing terhadap  Ekonomi Indonesia Masa VOC dan Orde Baru (Transformation in Surface 
Structrure of Foreign Interest Cooptation In Indonesia’s Economy during The VOC and New Order Eras),  
recently published in national seminar proceeding of History Learning inThe Centre of Change  form by Faculty 
of Social Science,  Universitas Negeri Malang and Asosiasi Pendidik and Peneliti Sejarah (Waskito and Ismain,  
2014, pp. 53-63). 
Note 2. Today, almost 85 % of Indonesia’s Oil and Gas are controlled by Foreigners. Foreign 
investments oil and gas sector has become more dominant. The number reached 11 billion USD in 2010 to 13,7 
billions USD in 2011, the increased is almost 20%. (Sprague, 2014: vii, in Yuwono, 2014.  Mafia Migas VS 
Pertamina Membongkar Skenario Asing di Indonesia. Yogkarta: Galang). 
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Note 3. Indonesia economist such as Sritua Arif and Adi Sasono. 
Note 4. Washington Consensus are 10 policies suggested by IMF to be implemented in aided country 
that are involved in crises (further information about those 10 policies could be seen in Prasentiantono, Tony A. 
IMF in  I. Wibowo and F Wahono (eds). 2003, Neoliberalisme. Yogyakarta: Cindelaras Pustaka Rakyat Cerdas. 
Note 5. ‘Unholy Trinity provides an important History lesson of how the IMF, World Bank, and WTO 
were twisted from their original mandates to serve the interests of Corporate globalization.’ John Cavanagh, 
Director, Institute for Policy Studies. 
Note 6. See Yuwono, I.D. 2014. Mafia Migas VS Pertamina Membongkar Skenario Asing di Indonesia.  
Yogkarta: Galang. 
Note 7. Indonesia’s Utang Luar Negeri (Foreign Debt) on January 2014 was noted USD269,3 billions 
which increased 7,1% (yoy), it has increased from the growth in Desember 2013 at 4,6% (yoy). This increase 
was mainly influenced by the private sector Foreign Debt position raise by 12,2% (yoy) to USD141,4 billions. 
Meanwhile, the public sector Foreign Debt position raised by 1,9% (yoy) to USD127,9 billions. Compared to the 
position from last month, the private sector Foreign Debt only grow by 0,6%,  while the public sector Foreign 
Debt increased by 3,5% (http://www.bi.go.id/id/ruang-media/info-terbaru/Pages/Utang-Luar-Negeri-Indonesia-
Januari-2014.aspx, accessed 5 September 2014). 
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